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Canadian governments took divergent approaches to tax policy in 
the 2009 budget season, one path leading to prosperity and the other
to disappointment and diminished prospects.
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TAX COMPETITIVENESS PROGRAMWhile Canadian federal and provincial governments have made progress in reducing the
tax burden on business investment in recent years, the 2009 budget season also saw more
counterproductive tax policies that favour certain industries and disadvantage others. In
this Commentary, the authors assess the implications of these trends for Canada’s
competitiveness as they update their annual survey of marginal effective tax rates in
Canada and individual provinces. 
The good news is that Canada’s marginal effective tax rate on capital has fallen from 28.9
percent in 2008 to 28.0 percent in 2009. With the tax changes planned in the current and
previous federal and provincial budgets for later years, the marginal effective tax rate will
fall further, to 18.9 percent by 2013. If no offsetting tax changes occur abroad by 2013,
these tax changes will place Canada’s rate for capital investment close to the average level
of marginal effective tax rates among 80 countries worldwide. In a changing world,
however, it is unrealistic to assume other countries will not reform their corporate taxes. 
The bad news is that the variation in marginal effective tax rates on capital across business
activities has been increasing since 2006, resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources.
Large and medium-size companies in certain sectors, such as communications, wholesale
trade and construction, are disadvantaged by the current tax system.
Provincially, the study finds clear leaders in terms of investment climate. In 2009, the
Atlantic Provinces, except for Prince Edward Island, taxed capital investment the least,
followed by Quebec and Alberta. Among this group of  provinces, Alberta’s low marginal
effective tax rate is directly associated with its low statutory income tax rate and the
absence of capital and sales taxes; the other provinces achieve their apparent overall tax
competitiveness by favouring slow-growth industries: manufacturing and forestry. 
The highest-taxed province in 2009 is still Ontario, but this is rapidly changing. Prince
Edward Island will become the highest-taxed province in 2013 at 29.2 percent, after
Ontario and British Columbia implement their sales tax harmonization and Ontario
reduces its corporate income tax rate to 10 percent. Manitoba will be second-highest taxed
at 27.0 percent, followed by Saskatchewan at 24.9 percent. These provinces have one
thing in common – an antiquated sales tax regime that applies high taxes on intermediate
and capital inputs. 
The study concludes with tax policy recommendations that would enhance Canada’s
competitiveness and stimulate economic growth and job creation as the country climbs
out of recession.
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A
mid a deep global recession,
federal and provincial govern-
ments faced a daunting task 
in setting their tax policies during the
2009 budget season. Unemployment
rates were rising sharply, tax revenues
were plummeting, and deficits
reappearing in most provinces.
The federal government and some provinces
responded with fiscal stimulus intended to buoy up
demand by Canadians for goods and services. 
Others reacted passively or took steps to avoid 
large fiscal deficits. 
In wake of this shift in Canada’s fortunes, federal
and provincial governments took two quite
different paths with respect to tax policy – one a
bright route leading to a pot of gold in terms of
economic growth and prosperity, and the other a
murky path leading to poorer competitiveness and
missed opportunities. 
The golden approach is exemplified by
competitive corporate tax rate relief, aimed at
achieving a more neutral tax system with respect to
tax burdens on business activities. This approach is
followed in New Brunswick’s income tax reforms,
Ontario’s  and British Columbia’s planned sales tax
harmonization with the federal GST and corporate
rate reductions applying to all industries. Both lower
rates and a more neutral tax system contribute to
better growth, as taxes interfere less with business
decisions on how to allocate resources to their best
economic use. Also, corporate rate relief can be
effective in shoring up corporate tax revenues,
because multinational companies have greater
incentive to shift profits to Canada, where corporate
rates are below those of many trading partners,
including the United States, Japan and France, and
are now similar to those of the United Kingdom and
Australia.1
The other, far less attractive approach, is for
governments to pick supposedly “winning”
industries, in many cases shoring up failing
industries through targeted tax cuts. When tax
incentives are directed at particular activities,
however, resources are not put to their best use,
because investment and production decisions are no
longer based on economic criteria alone but also are
designed to reduce tax payments. Further, when tax
incentives are narrowly targeted, they are less likely
to achieve their desired impact because suppliers of
inflexibly produced assets, such as land and, in the
short run, capital, boost their prices, thereby
undermining the profitability of the industry that is
intended to benefit from the tax incentive. 
In other instances, such as  accelerated depreciation
for manufacturing and processing machinery, the 
tax incentives are provided on a temporary basis –
and only potentially renewed at a later time – which
blunts their impact from a long-run perspective. 
Such incentives are intended to counteract the recent
economic malaise, in part by shifting investment
from future years to earlier ones, but at the cost of
depressing investment in later years. 
The good news is that Canada’s marginal effective
tax rate on capital has fallen from 28.9 percent in
2008 to 28.0 percent in 2009. With the tax changes
planned in the current and previous federal and
provincial budgets for later years, the marginal
effective tax rate will fall further, to 18.9 percent by
2013, as a result of three factors. First, the federal
corporate income tax rate will fall from 19 to 15
percent by 2012, which will more than offset the
expiration of the fast writeoffs for manufacturing
and processing and computer assets during this time.
Second, provincial corporate income tax reductions
and the ultimate elimination of provincial capital tax
will help reduce the marginal effective tax rate 
by almost 3 percentage points. Finally and quite
dramatically, the sales tax harmonization to be
implemented July 1, 2010 in both Ontario and
British Columbia will reduce the Canada-wide
marginal effective tax rate on capital by more than 
5 percentage points.
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1 It is sometimes argued that investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation as incentives for investment are less costly because they only apply to new
capital expenditures. However, with income shifting, corporate rate reductions have value to governments that go beyond providing incentives for
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If no offsetting tax changes occur abroad by 2013,
these tax changes will place Canada’s rate for capital
investment close to the average level of marginal
effective tax rates for capital investment among 80
countries worldwide which is 17.6 percent (our
latest estimate for 2008). In a changing world,
however, it is unrealistic to assume other countries
will not reform their corporate taxes. 
The bad news is that the variation in marginal
effective tax rates on capital across business activities
has been increasing since 2006, resulting in an
inefficient allocation of resources. Large and
medium-size companies in certain sectors, such as
communications, wholesale trade and construction,
are disadvantaged by the current tax system.
Elsewhere, tax incentives are so generous, as in the
case of Atlantic forestry and manufacturing, that the
marginal effective tax rate on capital is “negative,”
implying that businesses will over-invest in capital so
long as they can write off unused deductions from
profits earned on other investments. Even with the
planned reductions, the dispersion in marginal
effective tax rates across business activities  will be
worse in 2013 than in 2006, despite the sales tax
harmonization in Ontario and British Columbia,
corporate rate reductions, and the expiration of
some targeted tax credits. 
But while some governments might believe that
“reverse Reaganism” could work by targeting
incentives to encourage growth-oriented businesses,
there is no evidence that micromanaging the
corporate sector works (Harberger 1998, Jorgenson
and Yun 2002). For example, manufacturing output
recorded a negative annual growth rate of  -0.6
percent from 2003 to 2008, while service industries
grew at an annual rate of 3 percent over the same
period.2 Yet during that time, marginal effective tax
rates were much lower for manufacturing than the
service industries.3Thus, more support was given to
industries facing poor prospects for growth.
Studies have shown that corporate taxes can hurt
the economy most when they are not neutral among
industries (Dahlby 2008). Economic distortions
arising from non-neutral corporate tax policies in
Canada can increase the cost of raising revenue by as
much as 37 cents on each dollar of corporate tax
collected (Baylor and Beausejour 2004). Further,
these incentives increase compliance and
administrative costs, and many have not been
evaluated in terms of their effectiveness. 
As for labour taxation, governments have shown
little interest in reform except for New Brunswick,
which plans to flatten its personal income tax system
by reducing tax brackets from four to two, and by
reducing rates. And while Saskatchewan increased
the basic personal income tax exemption
significantly in late 2008, this had little impact on
the effective tax rate on labour, despite the
significant revenue cost to the province.
Governments should pay more attention to the
personal tax system, to encourage more efficient use
of labour resources in the economy.
Overall, the 2009 marginal effective tax rate on
labour, including personal income, payroll and sales
taxes (indicating the share of workers’ earnings
available for consumption), barely changes: 45.5
percent in 2008 and 45.3 percent in 2009. Despite
increases at the federal level in the basic personal
exemption and the bottom two personal income tax
brackets, as well as provincial changes, the growth in
inflation-adjusted earnings since 2008 resulted in
more taxpayers jumping into higher tax brackets –
known as bracket creep. 
In summary, given the decline in the effective tax
rate on capital in 2009, the effective tax rate on the
cost of doing business, which is an aggregate of the
effective tax rates on labour and capital, declines from
23.4 percent in 2008 to 22.9 percent in 2009. Canada
is becoming more tax competitive with respect to the
overall cost of production, but could achieve more if
governments established a more neutral tax system,
not just one with lower rates.
In the discussion below, we begin first with an
analysis of marginal effective tax rates on capital,
followed by an analysis of labour taxes and the impact
of taxes on the cost of doing business. We conclude
with some policy suggestions for further reforms.
2 Statistics Canada, Gross Domestic Product by Industry 15001-X, June 2009.
3 See various C. D. Howe Institute  papers that we have published in the past five years.Commentary 295 | 3
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Taxes on Capital Investment 
Governments have made many changes to the
taxation of capital. In the wake of a global recession,
tax measures have been introduced in a variety of
ways intended to encourage investment. 
The federal government has taken the lead in tax
reduction since 2000. Measures have included
federal tax reductions in corporate tax rates: from
29.12 percent in 2000, to 18 percent this year and
15 percent by 2012, as well as the elimination of the
preferential corporate rates for manufacturing –
resource profits are now taxed at the same rate as
other industries, owing to the replacement of the
resource allowance by resource royalty deductibility.
The federal capital tax has been fully eliminated for
non-financial institutions. Ottawa has also
encouraged provincial reductions in corporate
income tax rates to 10 percent, and provided
incentives for provinces to eliminate their capital
taxes. This year, Ontario, which is the largest
provincial economy, has announced that it will, in
2010, harmonize its sales tax with the federal GST,
as well as phase-in a reduction in its general
corporate income tax rate from 14 percent to 10
percent. This reduction would apply to all sectors,
thereby eliminating the differential corporate rates
for manufacturing and for resource industries,
which are currently taxed at 12 percent. British
Columbia has also announced recently its plan to
harmonize its sales tax with the federal GST,
effective in July 2010.
Generally, most provinces have been reducing
their taxes on investment, with reductions to
corporate income tax rates and the elimination of
the capital tax. However, like the federal
government, provinces have also been enhancing
targeted incentives for capital, which will be
discussed below in more detail.
As in our previous reports, we measure the
marginal effective tax rate on capital for medium
and large corporations in forestry, manufacturing,
construction, transportation, communications,
utilities, trade and business and household services.
The marginal effective tax rate is calculated as the
annualized value of corporate income tax, capital tax
and sales tax paid on capital purchases, as a share of
the gross rate of return on capital (Chen 2000). 
Taking into account budgetary changes in 2009,
as well as those legislated in earlier budgets to take
effect by 2009, the marginal effective tax rate on
capital in Canada has declined from 28.9 percent in
2008 to 28.0 percent in 2009, continuing on the
path of reductions that have taken place since the
beginning of this decade (see Figure 1). By 2013,
the marginal effective tax rate will decline to 18.9
percent.
By province, the sharpest reductions by 2013 will
be in Ontario, where the marginal effective tax rate
on capital will fall from the highest in Canada in
2009, at 33.6 percent, to 19.4 percent. This will still
be higher than the Canada-wide rate mainly due to
the relative importance of the household and
business services sector, which is taxed more heavily
than most other industries. Once tax policies are
fully implemented, Ontario will have a marginal
effective tax rate for non-resource industries that is
comparable to, although slightly higher than,
Alberta’s, which has no sales or capital taxes and a
corporate rate of 10 percent. The substantial
reduction in the marginal effective tax rate on
capital in Ontario by 2013 is due to: 1) a
combination of lower federal and Ontario corporate
rates – 15 and 10 percent, respectively; 2)  the
phasing-out of the Ontario capital tax; and 3) sales
tax harmonization,4 with the latter accounting for
almost half of the reduction. 
Second to Ontario, British Columbia will also
achieve a reduction of 10.7 percentage points in
marginal effective tax rate on capital, of which 80
percent can be attributed to harmonizing its sales
tax with the federal GST.5
4 Ontario will not reach full sales tax harmonization until 2018. Similar to the restricted input tax credit (ITC) system in Quebec, Ontario will impose a
five-year restriction on large firms for their claim of input tax credits for certain purchases and then phase in full input tax credits over a three-year
period. For details of this measure, see: http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/english/budget/ontariobudgets/2009/chpt3.html#c3_salestax
5 Similar to Ontario, the initial sales tax harmonization in British Columbia includes a temporary delay in providing full input tax credit for certain
goods and services. See http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2009-2013/2009PREM0017-000141.htm| 4 Commentary 295
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New Brunswick will have the lowest effective tax
rate on capital by 2013, at 3.8 percent, as a result of
three factors: a sharply lower corporate income tax
rate of 8 percent planned for 2012; the elimination
of the provincial capital tax; and the continuing
availability of the Atlantic investment tax credit,
which we assume for these calculations to be fully
applied against tax liability in the year at hand.6This
credit, however, is losing its purpose in wake of
recent, better measures, such as reducing corporate
income tax rates and eliminating the capital tax. 
Manitoba has reduced its corporate income tax
rate from 13 percent to 12 percent and will have
phased out the provincial capital tax by 2011. But it
has not announced any further reductions to come. 
Two other provinces – Nova Scotia and Quebec –
continue to reduce their capital tax rates on non-
financial businesses in tiny steps toward eventual
elimination. By 2013, Quebec’s marginal effective
tax rate on capital will fall to 17.2 percent, one point
below Alberta’s, mainly because of Quebec’s 5
percent investment tax credit for capital assets used
by manufacturing and processing businesses. Nova
Scotia’s marginal effective tax rate in 2013 will be
even lower at 16.1 percent, but driven by the federal
Atlantic Investment Tax Credit, rather than prefer-
ential provincial policy in Nova Scotia.
On the other hand, Quebec raised its corporate
income tax rate by a half percentage point from 
11.4 to 11.9 percent. In 2009, the Quebec marginal
effective tax rate on capital, at  20.9 percent, is the
fourth  lowest of all the provinces but slightly above
Alberta’s 20.5 percent. However, this relatively low
marginal effective tax rate on capital is largely
attributable to Quebec’s 5 percent investment tax
credit for the manufacturing and processing (M&P)
sector. Without this targeted tax credit, the marginal


















































Figure 1: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment: 2008, 2009 and 2013, Aggregate and by Province
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
6 In all probability, the Atlantic investment tax credit is not fully deducted from corporate taxes since a company may not be paying sufficient taxes to claim
the credit. This implies that the marginal effective tax rate would be higher than computed for investments in the Atlantic and qualifying Quebec regions.Commentary 295 | 5
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Table 1a: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment in Canada: 2009, 
by Industry and by Province
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.








Canada 10.8 27.3  36.8  17.5  32.6 31.9  27.0  37.4  34.2 28.0 
Nfld & Lab -39.9  NA  27.4  -18.7  25.2  26.7  22.2  26.0  23.9  15.5 
P.E.I. -57.2 NA  44.5  -40.3  39.7  38.3  35.9 48.7 41.7  30.9 
Nova Scotia -20.4  26.6  31.5  -8.8  30.8  30.9  26.1  29.8  28.3  20.4 
New Brunswick -29.7  21.5  26.0  -13.8  25.2  25.4  20.5  24.3  22.7  9.6 
Quebec 3.8 24.7  29.2  9.0  28.9 28.8  23.3  27.5  28.4 20.9 
Ontario 20.2 31.1  42.2  22.8  37.0 36.6  32.8  44.5  39.8 33.6 
Manitoba 4.9 30.3  40.5  5.1  35.9 35.4  32.8  42.9  39.9 31.4 
Saskatchewan 14.2 25.4  34.5  18.7  31.3 30.6  25.6  37.3  32.0 26.7 
Alberta 15.2 19.9  24.2  18.5  23.5 23.7  19.4  22.4  21.2 20.5 
British Columbia 19.2  26.0  36.8  21.6  31.7  31.2  26.2  39.2  34.1  29.5
Table 1a: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment in Canada: 2013, 
by Industry and by Province
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.








Canada 10.6 17.8 22.5 15.1 22.0 21.8 18.0 21.4 22.4 18.9
Nfld & Lab -35.4 NA  24.1 -17.0 22.2 23.5 19.2 22.9 21.5 13.1
P.E.I. -48.0 NA 42.3 -33.3 37.5 35.7 33.4 47.1 40.1 29.2
Nova Scotia -18.4 21.6 26.2 -8.9 25.7 25.8 21.1 24.7 23.8 16.1
New Brunswick -30.5 15.5 19.1 -18.8 18.7 18.7 14.7 17.9 17.1 3.8
Quebec 7.0 18.5 22.5 10.7 22.5 22.4 17.0 21.2 23.2 17.2
Ontario 16.9 17.0 21.0 18.2 20.5 20.6 17.4 19.6 22.1 19.4
Manitoba 7.8 24.1 35.0 7.7 29.9 29.3 27.1 38.3 35.4 27.0
Saskatchewan 16.5 22.7 31.9 19.5 28.8 27.8 22.9 35.2 30.0 24.9
Alberta 17.3 17.0 20.9 19.1 20.4 20.5 16.4 19.6 18.7 18.5
British Columbia 16.8 17.0 20.9 18.4 20.5 20.6 16.2 19.6 21.5 18.8C.D. Howe Institute
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Figure 2: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment: Prince Edward Island, 2009 and Optional Changes
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
Table 2: Policy Options for PEI, Manitoba, Saskatchewan: A METR Simulation
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
P.E.I. Manitoba Saskatchewan
Percent
Current Case 30.9 31.4 26.7
Case A = no provincial ITC + 10 percent    
provincial CIT rate 29.7 31.6 28.1
Case B = Case A + Sales tax harmonization 14.5 20.0 20.3Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Possible reforms in Quebec include reducing its
corporate income rate to 10 percent, and elimi-
nating the restriction on input tax credits under the
Quebec sales tax. By implementing these measures,
combined with eliminating the provincial capital tax
by 2011 as planned, Quebec would substantially
reduce tax distortions and achieve an overall
marginal effective tax rate on capital that is the 
same as Alberta’s. 
Provinces with the Best and Worst
Investment Climates
In 2009, the Atlantic Provinces, except for Prince
Edward Island, taxed capital investment the least,
followed by Quebec and Alberta (Table 1a). Among
this group of  provinces, Alberta’s low marginal
effective tax rate is directly associated with its low
statutory income tax rate and the absence of capital
and sales taxes; the other provinces achieve their
apparent overall tax competitiveness by favouring
slow-growth industries: manufacturing and forestry. 
The highest-taxed province in 2009 is still
Ontario, but this is rapidly changing. Prince Edward
Island will become the highest-taxed province in
2013, at 29.2 percent, after Ontario implements its
sales tax harmonization and reduces its corporate
income tax rate to 10 percent. Manitoba will be
second-highest taxed at 27.0 percent by 2013,
followed by Saskatchewan at 24.9 percent. These
provinces have one thing in common – an
antiquated sales tax regime that applies high taxes on
intermediate and capital inputs. 
To illustrate, we decomposed the marginal
effective tax rates in Prince Edward Island, which
best shows the effect of high tax rates with targeted
incentives for capital (Figure 2). PEI currently
provides the most generous investment tax credit 
for the forestry and manufacturing sectors, but
simultaneously imposes the highest general
corporate income tax rate (16 percent), along with
Nova Scotia, and the highest provincial sales tax rate
(10 percent), which heavily falls on intermediate
and capital inputs. In 2009, PEI has the second-
highest overall marginal effective tax rate among
provinces, but the lowest marginal effective tax rate
for the forestry and manufacturing sectors, which
qualify for the Atlantic Investment Tax credit and
provincial targeted incentives. Note that, as
measured by capital stock, these two sectors account
for less than 15 percent of business activity in PEI. 
Such a mismatch between government tax policy
and market resource allocation is obviously
questionable. If Prince Edward Island eliminated its
10 percent provincial investment tax credit for the
forestry and manufacturing sectors, and
simultaneously lowered the provincial corporate
income tax rate to 10 percent, it could cut the
marginal effective tax rate for all other sectors by 3
to 4 percentage points while still continuing to
favour the forestry and manufacturing sectors (as
indicated by a negative marginal effective tax rate). 
Furthermore, sales tax harmonization would
bring down the marginal effective tax rate in PEI by
almost 15 percentage points, which would benefit
all industries in the province. The role of the current
provincial investment tax credit is to offset the
provincial sales tax levied on capital inputs for the
forestry and manufacturing sectors. In other words,
the current provincial sales tax “claws back” most of
the tax benefit the forestry and manufacturing
sectors are intended to receive under the provincial
investment tax credit. 
Government Tax Policies Hurt the Service
Sectors  Most
Despite well-planned, staged reductions in business
taxation, federal and provincial governments have
failed to achieve greater neutrality in the business tax
structure. Little serious effort has been taken to
create a more neutral tax structure, as shown below,
because most governments have been using the tax
system to favour particular business activities. 
As pointed out in our report last year, the fast
write-off for machinery and equipment used in
manufacturing and processing, which Ottawa
introduced in 2007 and extended to 2011 in the
recent budget, narrowed the tax base; it increased
inter-industry and inter-asset variation by more than
50 percent (from 15 percent in 2006 to 27 percent
in 2007). In 2009, a temporary 100 percent
allowance for computer assets – well in excess of
economic depreciation – was also introduced toC.D. Howe Institute
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encourage the adaptation of new technologies
during times of economic stress. While less targeted
than the manufacturing depreciation allowance, this
allowance still erodes the tax base unduly, without
having established the case that more investment in
computers is critical at this particular time. The fast
write-off for computer assets reduces the marginal
effective tax rate by 0.6 percentage points, which is
more than 60 percent of the reduction in the
marginal effective tax rate on capital.
The federal and provincial governments have also
introduced new or enhanced incentives for
investments, several not reflected in the estimates
provided in Figure 1 and tables. These include the
following: labour-sponsored venture capital credits
in New Brunswick and Newfoundland & Labrador;
film or digital tax credits in Ontario, Manitoba,
Quebec and Nova Scotia; investment tax credits in
Manitoba; small business preferences in almost all
provinces; small business financing in New
Brunswick and Manitoba; and research and
development tax credits in Alberta, the latter limited
to small expenditures below $4 million. 
Overall, the business tax structure is becoming
more distortionary, thereby undermining
productivity to the extent that resources are not put
to their best economic use. As seen in Tables 1a and
1b, Canada continues to follow a traditional policy
of providing greater tax relief to resource and
manufacturing industries, as compared to the faster
growing and increasingly trade-exposed service
sectors, including utilities, communications, trade
and business services. The gap in marginal effective
tax rates on capital between one of the highest-taxed
sectors, communications, and the lowest-taxed
sector, forestry, will be 11 percentage points in 2013.
We also provide a measure of inter-industry and
inter-asset distortions relative to the level of the
aggregate tax burden (Table 3).7 In 2006, the overall
distortion, measured by our dispersion index, was
26.6 percent, rising to 39.1 percent in 2007 due to
new tax preferences introduced at that time. It has
further risen to 48.2 percent and 49.3 percent in
2008 and 2009, respectively. It is expected to
decline by 2013 with corporate rate reductions,
capital tax elimination, the expiration of some
targeted incentives and sales tax harmonization in
Ontario. However, a fall in the 2013 dispersion
index is not a foregone conclusion if governments
continue to introduce targeted incentives to support
specific business activities.
Using targeted tax preferences is a habit that tax
policymakers have difficulty kicking. For example,
the accelerated manufacturing and processing
capital cost allowance benefits the forestry and
manufacturing industries.8 It was introduced in
1972 and eliminated with corporate tax reform in
the late 1980s. It was then re-introduced in 2007
for two years and then twice extended to future
years. The allowance provides much less assistance
to companies that are currently not paying taxes
and it results in a substitution of machinery for
other factors of production. As discussed in the
introduction, such tax distortions result in lower
economic performance.
Quebec has been most active in micromanaging
the industrial sector through tax policy. While the
Charest government curtailed a number of tax
preferences several years ago, after giving up on some
reforms it has recently resorted to introducing or
enhancing a large number of tax incentives. These
incentives range from investment tax credits to tax
holidays. Corporate income tax holidays are the least
effective incentive in spurring long-term investments
compared to other targeted preferences – and they
also cost the government a bundle of revenue.9
7 The dispersion index is computed as the standard deviation of inter-sectoral and inter-asset marginal effective tax rates divided by the average marginal
effective tax rate. It corresponds to but is not a measure of the marginal costs of funds (efficiency cost of raising taxes). It can be shown that if the
dispersion index is zero the size of distortions relative to the average tax rate is zero.
8 Our simulation shows that the single most distorting factor in our business tax structure is the investment tax credit given to manufacturing and
processing assets. Eliminating this tax measure, which benefits only the forestry and manufacturing sectors, could reduce the inter-industry tax
distortion by a third (Table 4).
9 See Mintz (1990) for an analysis of tax holidays popularly used in Third World countries in terms of investment and revenue impacts. We have not
included tax holidays in our estimates in this report because the holidays apply to a small share of investment expenditures.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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The Quebec government has introduced an ill-
designed 10-year income tax holiday for
commercialization of intellectual property, which
was similarly introduced last year in Ontario. There
are restrictive conditions attached to such a tax
holiday, which not only complicate tax
administration and encourage tax planning but
discriminate against other types of intellectual
property commercialization mechanisms, such as a
commercialization undertaken by an existing
company or a commercialization dealing with
intellectual property developed by “unqualified”
institutions. 
Quebec is not the only province to use targeted
tax incentives excessively, but it has the most
extensive system. Other provinces have a list of tax
incentives, and as in Quebec, they are rarely tested
as to whether they achieve positive economic
results. Alberta has relied less on targeted
incentives, but, as mentioned, has introduced a
research and development tax credit that is limited
to small amounts of spending. It is far from clear
that the incentive will generate much research,
because large and medium-size companies will
find it of little value.
Taxes on Labour 
Taxes directly affecting labour market conditions 
are those levied on personal income, employer and
employee payroll, as well as sales and excise taxes. 
In our analysis, the marginal effective tax rate on
labour income is the tax paid as a percentage of the
pre-tax wage paid by employers on the last hour of
work, taking into account personal income, payroll
and sales taxes that reduce employment income
received by the worker (see Mintz 2001 for an
explanation). 
This tax measure emphasizes the impact of taxes
on the decision to work extra hours rather than the
decision to join the workforce (which depends on
the value of after-tax income from a job as opposed
to staying at home). Empirical studies on labour
taxes focus on both the incentive to work extra hours
and participation in the labour force. Taxes
discourage people from working by substituting
untaxed leisure for money income to buy goods and
services. On the other hand, taxes may encourage
people to work more to make up for lost income.
With respect to incentive effects, studies suggest that
taxes have a relatively small impact on labour supply
from primary workers but a larger and significant
effect on secondary workers (Mintz 2001 and
Dahlby 2008 for a review of recent studies). 
Table 3: Dispersion Index for Marginal Effective Tax Rates (METR) on Capital Investment
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2013
Percent
Inter-industry 15.4 25.6 32.0 32.7 24.4 
Inter-asset 27.8 36.4 45.6 46.8 34.7 
Overall 26.6 39.1 48.2 49.3 38.0 Taxes can also affect employment decisions to the
extent that workers bargain for higher wages to
make up for lost income in the presence of taxation.
Studies have suggested that 20 to 30 percent of
labour taxes are shifted forward (see Mintz 2001).
Differential taxes across industries would be shifted
more strongly forward since workers can shift more
easily between industries to avoid the tax. 
Taxes also affect inter-provincial, and to a much
more limited extent, international migratory
decisions. The decision for someone to move from
one jurisdiction to another depends on a
comparison of taxes paid on total income earned
(the average tax rate) as well as the lifestyle amenities
available in each jurisdiction.10 Our measure of the
marginal effective tax rate is not relevant to the
migration decision for this reason. However, to the
extent that the tax system is progressive (higher
average and marginal tax rates on upper income
households compared to low income households),
labour migration would be affected. All else being
the same, a province with a more progressive tax will
encourage lower-income workers to migrate to it
and high-income workers to move to other
provinces. Provincial policies that redistribute
income through more progressive tax structures can
therefore be undone by migration since the
individuals receive the same after-tax income across
all provinces – migration causes skilled wage levels
to rise  and unskilled wages to fall in a province with
a more progressive income compared to other
provinces. In Canada, inter-provincial migration is
sensitive to taxes and subsidies but much less so with
respect to the francophone population, which has a
strong attachment to Quebec (Day 1992).
The single most important federal budgetary
change in 2009, with respect to the marginal
effective tax rate on labour income, is the 7.5
percent rise in the basic personal amount and the
bottom two personal income tax brackets.
Considering the national average inflation-adjusted
growth rate for 2008 earnings was below 3 percent,
this federal tax change will reduce the tax burden for
most taxpayers. 
The Labour-Tax Burden by Province
At the provincial level, both New Brunswick and
Newfoundland & Labrador have reduced their
personal income tax rates, in addition to indexing
income for inflation (Figure 3a). In Newfoundland
& Labrador, the 1 percentage point tax reduction
that took effect in the second half of 2008 will have
its full impact in 2009. In New Brunswick, tax relief
and restructuring is just beginning. Tax-rate
reductions in New Brunswick will continue until
2012 when the province attains a two-tier personal
income tax regime with low rates (9 and 12
percent). This tax structure will be second only to
Alberta in terms of both simplicity and efficiency.
To compete with Alberta, Saskatchewan, in the fall
of 2008, introduced a much higher personal
exemption rate, raising it to $13,269 for a single
person for 2009, and double that amount for a
couple. 
Unfortunately, other provinces have made few
broad tax reductions for labour earnings. In fact,
several provinces have indexed their personal income
tax brackets at a rate lower than the growth rate in
nominal earnings. As a result, the marginal effective
tax rate on labour arising from provincial income
taxation may slightly rise and even outweigh the tax
benefit arising from the federal increase in personal
income tax brackets. This is the case for British
Columbia, with 2 percent indexation versus 2.7
percent actual earnings growth, and Saskatchewan,
with 2.5 percent versus 4.6 percent, respectively, 
for 2009. 
Overall, labour income is least taxed in Alberta
because of its single 10 percent personal income tax
rate, combined with a generous basic allowance
($16,775) that applies in claiming the non-
refundable tax credit. After Alberta, the next lowest-
taxed provinces are British Columbia, Saskatchewan
and New Brunswick. On the other end of the
spectrum, Quebec is the highest-taxed province for
labour, followed by Ontario, Manitoba and the
remaining three Atlantic provinces. 
C.D. Howe Institute
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Figure 3a: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Labour by Province: A Comparison between 2007, 2008 and 2009
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.



























































Figure 3b: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Labour by Industry: A Comparison between 2007, 2008 and 2009
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.| 12 Commentary 295
The Labour Tax Burden by Industry
Because we measure the tax burden on labour by the
marginal effective tax rate, a cross-industry comparison
is affected by industrial variation in labour income. For
example, the lowest tax burdens on labour appear to be
in the sectors with average earnings well below the
national level, such as retail trade and the other services
sector. The exception is the construction sector in
which earning levels are above the national average,
while the tax burden on labour is the third lowest of all
industries. This is because the largest provincial activity
in the construction sector in recent years has been in
Alberta (39 percent) where the marginal effective tax
rate on labour is the lowest of all provinces. The tax
advantage for the construction sector would be reduced
if the construction sector in Alberta shrank compared
to that in other provinces. 
As another important point, payroll taxes (net of
associated benefits) vary across industries (and
provinces) because of Employment Insurance. As
reflected in our calculations, the forest and
construction industries benefit most, in that benefits
claimed are well in excess of contributions to the
program. Some service sectors, such as
communications, transportation and utilities, are
disadvantaged by the Employment Insurance
program since benefits claimed are well below
contributions made by employers and employees. 
Burdens and the Cost of Doing Business 
Companies use capital and labour as inputs to do
business. Taxes on labour and capital are therefore
taxes on the cost of doing business. We estimate, by
industry, marginal effective tax rates on the costs of
doing business by aggregating the individual effective
tax rates on capital and labour according to the
relative shares of capital and labour in the sector’s
value-added. Taxes on capital are assumed to fully
increase costs, because in an open economy businesses
cannot shift the burden of taxes by reducing the cost
of capital. With respect to labour, taxes increase
business costs to the extent that such taxes are shifted
forward in the form of higher wages – the portion
shifted forward is assumed to be 30 percent.11
The tax burden on the cost of doing business in
Canada fell from 23.4 percent in 2008 to 22.9
percent in 2009 (Figures 4a and 4b). This largely
reflects the reduction in the effective tax rate on
capital somewhat offset by higher consumption taxes
in some provinces. With planned reductions in
corporate taxes and sales tax harmonization, the tax
on the cost of doing business will decline most in
Ontario and British Columbia in the future.
Moving from Divergence to Convergence 
The current-year budgetary tax changes reflect an
eye-popping divergence in approach to tax policy
among provinces: New Brunswick is pursuing broad
structural reforms to its personal and business tax
structures to improve simplicity and efficiency.
Ontario and British Columbia will adopt a more
efficient and fair sales tax structure by harmonizing
their individual sales tax regimes with the federal
GST. Ontario will also eliminate its dual corporate
income tax rate for large companies (12 for
manufacturing and resource income and 14 percent
for other companies) to a single rate of 10 percent. 
On the other end of the spectrum, several
provinces have failed to improve their tax structures.
Prince Edward Island retains the most outdated
structure, with high tax rates on corporate income
and retail sales. Quebec, while moving to abolish its
capital tax, is raising its corporation income tax rate
from 11.4 to 11.9 percent rather than moving to a
more neutral tax base by reducing its complex
regime of targeted incentives. 
Below, we provide some policy simulations that are
intended to demonstrate that provincial convergence
to a 10 percent corporate rate, elimination of many
targeted incentives and the replacement of the retail
sales tax with a GST-like provincial sales tax would not
only improve competitiveness in reducing the
aggregate effective marginal tax rate but would reduce
distortions in the tax system. 
Canada’s marginal effective tax rate profile by
2013, based on legislated intentions of governments,
will be 18.9 percent on capital, 45.6 percent on
labour and 19.7 percent on the cost of doing
business (Table 4). This, no doubt, will be a major
C.D. Howe Institute
11 One could argue that differential tax rates across provinces might be shifted forward to businesses more strongly than 30 percent as modeled here due to
labour mobility. However, we do not know the degree to which mobility affects forward shifting of marginal effective tax rate inter-provincial differentials.Commentary 295 | 13
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Figure 4a: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Cost by Province: A Comparison between 2007, 2008 and 2009
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.





























































Figure 4b: Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Cost by Industry: A Comparison between 2007, 2008 and 2009
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.| 14 Commentary 295
achievement and will put Canada close to the
average tax burden on capital among 80 countries
(See Chen & Mintz, 2008b). However, we can do
even better, particularly in improving tax neutrality.
Suitable reforms would include the following:
￿ Three provinces, Manitoba, Prince Edward
Island and Saskatchewan) continue relying on a
distortive retail sales tax that harms businesses’
competitiveness. Adopting a sales tax
harmonized with the federal GST would largely
eliminate taxes on intermediate and capital
goods, improve business competitiveness and
reduce variability in effective sales tax on
consumer products. 
￿ To improve efficiency and simplicity, federal and
provincial governments could eliminate targeted
tax incentives and thereby broaden the tax base. 
￿ Provinces could reduce corporate income tax
rates to 10 percent. Federal rate reductions
would be more affordable with the elimination
of preferences, perhaps allowing for a further
rate cut below 15 percent. 
The combined result of the above changes to
business taxation would be to reduce our current
projection for the 2013 marginal effective tax rate
on capital by another half percentage point, and
reduce the inter-industry and inter-assed tax
distortions by more than 50 percent. 
Finally, differential tax rates across industries
should also be reduced with respect to the taxation
of labour. For example, payroll taxes and benefits
associated with employment insurance, in particular,
vary across industries.
Similar to New Brunswick, provinces could
consider flattening their tax schedules at the
personal level. As discussed above, provincial
attempts to redistribute income can be undone by
labour migration. A province that increases the rate
progressivity in its tax structure loses high income
taxpayers to other provinces, while attracting low-
income taxpayers from other regions. Skilled wages
increase and unskilled wages are depressed as a
result, countering the attempt to redistribute
income from the rich to the poor. Redistributive tax
policies would be more effective at the federal level. 
As an example, if provinces adopted a flat 10
percent personal income tax rate, the marginal
effective tax rate on labour would fall from 45
percent to below 42 percent. Implementing all of
the tax changes proposed above would reduce the
marginal effective tax rate on costs from 19.5
percent to 18.0 percent. 
Conclusions 
In recent years, federal and provincial governments
have done an admirable job in reducing corporate
tax rates. The reductions not only increase corporate
investment but also help governments counteract
income-shifting that erodes their tax base as
multinational companies shift profits from high- 
to low-tax regions of the world.
Disappointingly, however, there has been a lack of
focus on improving the neutrality of the tax system.
Effective tax rates have increasingly varied across
sectors, especially hurting most service industries,
which are the strongest source of jobs in Canada.
They are also becoming more exposed to inter-
national trade and therefore external competition. 
Cutting rates is not good enough to improve
productivity. Neutrality is also important.
Governments should make a greater attempt to
avoid using targeted preferences and remove
distortions that impede productivity. We believe
that both the federal and provincial governments
should reduce their reliance on targeted incentives
that distort economic decision-making and increase
administrative and compliance cost burdens.
Provincially, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and
Saskatchewan should reform their sales tax systems
along the lines recently pursued by Ontario and
British Columbia. Provincial corporate rates should
be reduced to 10 percent, with differential rates on
profits across industries removed entirely. Further,
variations in effective tax rates on labour across
industries and provinces should also be curtailed.
Such reforms hold the promise of stimulating
business investment across all sectors and creating
fresh employment as Canada climbs out of its recent
recession.
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 295 | 15
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Table 4: Policy Simulations for 2013
a The increase in the METR dispersion index is primarily attributable to the lower average METR, rather than the standard deviation, which changed little in these cases.
bThis simulation also implies no restriction on input tax credits, which is embedded in Quebec's sales tax, legislated for the first five years in Ontario's sales tax harmonization, and planned for
the initial sales tax harmonization in British Columbia.
Source: School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
METR METR dispersion index
Percent
A. Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) On Capital
2006 36.2  15.4 
2007 31.6  25.6 
2008 28.9  32.0 
2009 28.0  32.7a
Tax Changes by 2013: Announced 
Federal corporation income tax reduction by 4 points 25.2  34.8a
Federal ending the fast write-off for M&P and computer 26.6  23.6 
Provincial corporate rate reduction and capital tax elimination 24.1  23.5a
Sales tax harmonization in Ontario and BC 18.9  24.4a
Tax changes by 2013: Assumed
Case A: Nationwide sales tax harmonization
b 17.4  25.1a
Case B = A + Elimination of all investment tax credits 18.9  11.7 
Case C = B + A + 10 percent corporate rate in all provinces 18.4  11.7 
B. METR on Labour
The current projection for 2013 45.6 
Case D: 10 percent flat provincial PIT rate 41.9 
C. METR on Costs
The current projection for 2013 19.5 
Case E = Case C + Case D 18.0 | 16 Commentary 295
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